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Abstract
In this paper we use the nonrepresentable ring E
(m)
p to introduce public key cryp-
tosystems in noncommutative settings and based on the Semigroup Action Problem
and the Decomposition Problem respectively.
1 Introduction
Most public-key cryptosystems are based on certain specific problems of number theory.
One of these problems is the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) over the ring Zn, being
n the product of two large prime numbers; the well known cryptosystem RSA [22] is based
in this problem. The second classical problem is the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
over a finite field Zp, being p a large prime; the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
[9] and ElGamal protocol [10] are based on this problem. In general, we can say that
their robustness depends on the computational difficulty of solving certain mathematical
problems over finite commutative algebraic structures. Some efficient attacks based on
the commutative property of these structures are well known: Quadratic Sieve, General
Number Field Sieve, Pollard’s rho algorithm, Index-Calculus, etc. (see, for example, [19,
28], and the references within these books).
This fact, together with the increase of the computational power of modern computers,
has made these techniques become more and more insecure. As a result there exists
an active field of research known as noncommutative algebraic cryptography (see, for
example, [2, 12, 13, 23, 26]) aiming to develop and analyse new cryptosystems and key
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exchange protocols based on noncommutative cryptographic platforms. A very good
exposition of the problems underlying in this noncommutative approach can be found in
[20] and some of them are the following, where G is a nonabelian group:
• Conjugator Search Problem (CSP): Given (x, y) ∈ G × G, the problem is to find
z ∈ G such that y = z−1xz.
• Decomposition Problem (DP): Given (x, y) ∈ G× G and S ⊆ G, the problem is to
find z1, z2 ∈ S such that y = z1xz2.
• Symmetrical Decomposition Problem (SDP): Given (x, y) ∈ G × G and m,n ∈ Z,
the problem is to find z ∈ G such that y = zmxzn.
• Generalized Symmetrical Decomposition Problem (GSDP): Given (x, y) ∈ G × G,
S ⊆ G and m,n ∈ Z, the problem is to find z ∈ S such that y = zmxzn.
Note that for the DP we can assume that G is a semigroup, since in this case we do
not need invertible elements.
Several authors have proposed and used certain nonabelian groups for key exchange
problems. In [1, 2, 12, 13], the authors suggest to use braid groups as platform groups
for their respective protocols. In [21], the authors propose a public key cryptosystem
whose security is based on the DLP for the automorphism defined by the conjugation
operation and the difficulty to find the conjugate element on finite nonabelian groups. In
[24], the authors suggest the use of a finite representation of a nonabelian group, called
Thomson’s group, to develop a public key cryptosystem, where they raised for the first
time the difficulty to find a solution for the SDP. Finally, in [29], the authors propose a
cryptosystem whose robustness is based on the difficulty to solve the CSP and SDP over
any noncommutative algebraic structure.
In the noncommutative setting, we can find different implementations based on the
Diffie-Hellman protocol in matrix rings, for different kind of matrices [4, 27, 30]. A de-
tachable recent work in this setting is [16] where the author shows the usability of a
certain class of matrices that arise a noncommutative framework to define the ElGamal
cryptosystem and the corresponding Diffie-Hellman protocol as well as its eficiency. An-
other system based on the discrete logarithm problem in the authomorphisms group is the
so-called MOR cryptosystem, recently described for authomorphisms of p-groups whose
order is coprime to p in [15, 17].
Moreover, the idea to develop systems of open distribution keys as well as session key
exchange protocols, on the basis of noncommutative (semi)groups, is present in [14, 23, 26].
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Finally, with the idea to generalize the protocols based on groups and take advantage
of the difficulty of to solve the DLP in these groups, Shpilrain and Zapata in [25] give
a general framework using actions of groups to define key exchange protocols. In this
setting, Maze et al. [18] introduce the Semigroup Action Problem (SAP) as:
Let G be a finite semigroup acting on a finite set S. Given x, y ∈ S with
y = g · x for some g ∈ G, find h ∈ G such that y = h · x.
In this way, any Abelian semigroup G acting on a finite set S provides a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol and an ElGamal protocol (cf. [18]).
Our aim in this paper is to provide public key cryptosystems in a noncommutative
setting given by the ring E
(m)
p based on the SAP and DP. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows. In Section 2 we remind some properties of the nonrepresentable
ring E
(m)
p that will be used through this paper. In Section 3 we use an action of the ring
E
(m)
p to introduce a public key cryptosystem based on the SAP. Finally, in Section 4 we
use this ring to give a public key cryptosystem based on the DP and we relate security of
both introduced cryptosystems.
2 The ring E
(m)
p
Bergman [3] proved that End(Zp × Zp2) is a semilocal ring that cannot be embedded in
matrices over any commutative ring. In [6] the authors showed that End(Zp × Zp2) is
isomorphic to a ring whose elements can be expressed as square matrices whose rows are
given by elements in Zp and Zp2 respectively and with an arithmetic that is similar to
matrix addition and multiplication. Then they use this ring to define a key exchange
protocol (see also [5, 7]). However this was cryptoanalyzed in [11] using some invertible
elements, which motivated the introduction of an extension of such a ring [8] such that
almost all elements are noninvertible
This new ring is defined as the set (see [8, Theorem 1])
E(m)p =
{
[aij ] ∈ Matm×m(Z) | aij ∈ Zpi if i ≤ j, and aij ∈ p
i−jZpj if i > j
}
with the addition and the multiplication defined, respectively, as follows
[
aij
]
+
[
bij
]
=
[
(aij + bij) mod p
i
]
,
[
aij
]
·
[
bij
]
=
[(
m∑
k=1
aikbkj
)
mod pi
]
.
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Here Matm×m(Z) denotes the set of m×m matrices with entries in Z, and p
rZps denotes
the set {pru | u ∈ Zps} for positive integers r y s. Moreover,
∣∣∣E(m)p ∣∣∣ = p(2m3+3m2+m)/6.
The following results on the ring E
(m)
p can be found in [8].
Theorem 1 (Theorem 3 of [8]): Let A = [aij ] ∈ E
(m)
p . Then A is invertible if and
only if aii 6≡p 0 for every i = 1, 2, . . . , m.
As a consequence, the number of invertible elements in E
(m)
p is p(2m
3+3m2−5m)/6 (see
[8, Corollary 1]). Moreover, the fraction of invertible elements in E
(m)
p is
(
p−1
p
)m
. So, an
adequate election of p and m may result that the number of invertible elements in E
(m)
p
is almost zero (see [8, Tables 1 and 2]).
Another needed property is the characterization of the center of the ring E
(m)
p . The
following result provides such a characterization.
Theorem 2 (Page 359 of [8]): The center of E
(m)
p is given by the set
Z(E(m)p ) =
{
[aij ] ∈ E
(m)
p | aii =
i−1∑
j=0
pjuj, with uj ∈ Zp and aij = 0 if i 6= j
}
.
As a consequence the number of central elements in E
(m)
p is pm.
3 A public key cryptosystem based on the SAP
Our aim in this section is to use the arithmetic of the ring E
(m)
p and an action of this ring
to define a public key cryptosystem in a noncommutative setting.
Thus, based on the multiplication defined on the ring E
(m)
p and the structure of its
elements we may define an action of the ring E
(m)
p over the set Zp × Zp2 × · · · × Zpm . As
we will show, this action will arise a public key cryptosystem based on the SAP (cf. [18]).
Let us consider the center Z(E
(m)
p ) of the ring E
(m)
p . For a givenM ∈ E
(m)
p , let Cen(M)
be the set of elements X in E
(m)
p such that XM = MX . The algorithm is given by the
following
Algorithm 1: Let M ∈ E
(m)
p be a public value and S ∈ Zp×Zp2×· · ·×Zpm the message
that Bob wants to send Alice. Then:
1. Alice chooses R ∈ Zp × Zp2 × · · · × Zpm, F ∈ Cen(M) and computes T = F · R.
2. Alice makes public the pair (R, T ), keeping secret her private key F .
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3. Bob chooses randomly G =
k∑
i=0
CiM
i, where Ci ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ) and sends Alice the pair
(H,D) = (G · R, S +G · T ).
4. Alice gets the secret by computing S = D − F ·H.
Note that the commutativity of F and G gives the correctness of the preceding algo-
rithm and that Alice and Bob could exchange the way they choose the elements appearing
through it.
As it is asserted in the general case in [18] we can observe that breaking the preceding
algorithm involves solving the SAP, i.e., given the values R and T = F · R ∈ Zp × Zp2 ×
· · · × Zpm, find A ∈ E
(m)
p such that T = A ·R.
To understand the size of the underlying SAP, let p be a prime, consider x ∈ Zpm
coprime to p, and let n be the order of x. Now let M = [aij ] be the element of E
(m)
p given
by
aij =

x, for i = j = m,0, otherwise.
For k = 1, 2, . . ., assume that Mk = [a
(k)
ij ]; then
a
(k)
ij =

x
k, for i = j = m,
0, otherwise.
Thus it is clear that Mn+1 =M and M,M2, . . . ,Mn are pairwise different. Since M0 = I
(by definition), the elements of G =
n∑
k=0
CkM
k are in Cen(M) and have the form
G = diag
(
c
(0)
0 , c
(0)
0 + c
(0)
1 p, . . . ,
m−2∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l,
m−1∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l +
n∑
k=1
(
m−1∑
l=0
c
(k)
l p
l
)
xk
)
(1)
where, by Theorem 2,
Ck = diag
(
c
(k)
0 , c
(k)
0 + c
(k)
1 p, . . . ,
m−2∑
l=0
c
(k)
l p
l,
m−1∑
l=0
c
(k)
l p
l
)
.
Thus, accordingly to expression (1), for every possible choice of the element
C0 = diag
(
c
(0)
0 , c
(0)
0 + c
(0)
1 p, . . . ,
m−2∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l,
m−1∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l
)
in Z(E
(m)
p ), there are as many elements G as the number of elements of the set{
m−1∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l +
n∑
k=1
(
m−1∑
l=0
c
(k)
l p
l
)
xk | C1, . . . , Cn ∈ Z(E
(m)
p )
}
. (2)
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We point out that in the preceding expression, C1, . . . , Cn are not necessarily distinct
and many of them could be the zero element in E
(m)
p .
But the set given in expression (2) may be expressed as{
m−1∑
l=0
c
(0)
l p
l +
m−1∑
l=0
(
n∑
k=1
c
(k)
l x
k
)
pl | C1, . . . , Cn ∈ Z(E
(m)
p )
}
which gives all the elements of Zpm given that C1, . . . , Cn may be chosen in such a way that
we get the p-adic decomposition of every element in Zpm . Therefore, for every element in
Z(E
(m)
p ), there are as many elements G as elements in Zpm , which results that we have
pm · pm = p2m different possibilities to select the element G.
An analogous result is obtained for M = [aij ] with
aij =


x, for i = j = m,
ypm−1, for i = m and j = 1,
0, otherwise.
and y ∈ Zp is an element of order p− 1.
On the other hand, in [18] the authors show that the nearest the semigroup acting
on the corresponding set is to be a group, i.e. the bigger the subgroup of units in the
semigroup is, the easier is to develop a Polling-Hellman algorithm in the semigroup to
compute the corresponding discrete logarithm. In this case, as it was noted previously,
the set of noninvertible elements in E
(m)
p might be very close to the whole semigroup with
an adequate election of p and m.
An additional property of the preceding algorithm is the use of a different G for every
encryption. In ElGamal cryptosystem [10] the election of a random parameter in every
encryption avoids an attack based on a pair plain text-encrypted text, given the existence
of invertible elements. The same idea cannot be developed in this case due to the almost
nonexistence of invertible elements. As in ElGamal case, the election of a different G in
every encryption avoids repetition attacks.
Now let (R, T ) be a public key, with T = F · R, where F ∈ Cen(M), and let A be a
solution of the SAP, i.e., A ·R = T . Suppose also that G in step 3 of Algorithm 1 is such
that AG = GA. Then, given the encrypted message
(H,D) = (G ·R, S +G · T )
we have that
S +G · T − (AG) · R = S + (GA) · R− (AG) ·R = S.
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Thus it is crucial that the element G in step 3 of Algorithm 1 does not commute with
the solution A of the SAP. Therefore to avoid that G commute with any such solution,
we must require that G is not in the center of the multiplicative semigroup of E
(m)
p , which
can be easily checked by requiring that there exists at least a nonzero element out of its
main diagonal (see Theorem 2).
Then suppose that an attacker tries to find A ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ) being a solution of the SAP,
i.e., A · R = T . Thus, again, according to Theorem 2, A must be of the form
A = diag
(
a0, a0 + a1p, . . . ,
m−2∑
j=0
ajp
j ,
m−1∑
j=0
ajp
j
)
, (3)
with aj ∈ Zp for every j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , m− 1.
Theorem 3: Assume that
R = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) and T = (t0, t1, . . . , tm−1)
are elements in Zp×Zp2×· · ·×Zpm such that A·R = T . If rj 6≡p 0 for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , m−1
then
r−10 t0 ≡p r
−1
1 t1 ≡p · · · ≡p r
−1
m−1tm−1.
Proof: Since A · R = T it follows that
a0r0 ≡p t0, (4)
(a0 + pa1 + · · ·+ p
jaj)rj ≡pj+1 tj, for j = 1, 2, . . . , m− 1. (5)
Now, from expression (4) and the fact that r0 6≡p 0, we obtain that a0 ≡p r
−1
0 t0.
Assume now that j = 1, 2, . . . , m− 1. From expression (5) we have that
(a0 + pa1 + · · ·+ p
jaj)rj − tj = p
j+1h, for some h ∈ Z,
so, p | (tj − a0rj). Therefore, a0rj ≡p tj and using the fact that rj 6≡p 0, we obtain that
a0 ≡p r
−1
j tj. 
As an immediate consequence we get the following result.
Corollary 1: Let F ∈ E
(m)
p as in Algorithm 1 defining a public key (R, T ), of some user,
with T = F · R, being R = (r0, r1, . . . , rm−1) and T = (t0, t1, . . . , tm−1) with rj, tj ∈ Zpj+1,
for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , m− 1. If p ∤ rj for every j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , m − 1 and there exits k such
that r−1k tk 6≡p r
−1
0 t0, then an attacker cannot compute A ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ) such that T = A · R.
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4 A public key cryptosystem based on the DP
Our aim in this section is to give a trap-door function based on the DP in E
(m)
p following
ElGamal’s ideas in the case of the DLP. ElGamal [10] introduced his cryptosystem based
on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [9]. Thus we provide a key exchange in the
ring E
(m)
p following the CAKE concept introduced in [25, Definition 3].
To do so, given M ∈ E
(m)
p , we will consider the set
H(M) =
{
k∑
i=0
CiM
i | Ci ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ), k ∈ Z
+
}
(6)
where Z(E
(m)
p ) is the center of the semiring E
(m)
p (see Theorem 2) and Z+ denotes the set
of positive integers.
Protocol 1 (DHDP protocol): Alice and Bob agree on two public elements X,M ∈
E
(m)
p such that M /∈ Cen(X).
1. Alice chooses two different elements A1, A2 ∈ H(M) and transmits GA = A1XA2
to Bob.
2. Bob chooses B1, B2 ∈ Cen(M) such that B1X 6= XB2 and transmits GB = B1XB2
to Alice.
3. Alice computes A1GBA2.
4. Bob computes B1GAB2.
Now it is clear that both Alice and Bob share a common value and that they could
exchange their roles in the way they choose their corresponding private information. The
latter is a particular case of [25, Example 3], where the authors illustrate a protocol based
on the DP in a general semigroup.
Trying to break the preceding protocol, in its general setting as it is shown in [25,
Example 3] gives rise to the following problem directly related to the DP.
Definition 1: Let G be a semigroup, A,B ⊆ G two subsemigroups such that ab = ba
for every a ∈ A and b ∈ B and assume that x ∈ G. The DH Decomposition Problem
(DHDP) consists in given two elements a1xa2 and b1xb2, with a1, a2 ∈ A and b1, b2 ∈ B
such that provide a DHDP key exchange as above, find the element a1b1xb2a2.
It is immediate that being able to solve the DP implies that we will be able to solve
the DHDP.
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On the other hand, in [6] (see also [5, 7]) the authors introduce a key exchange protocol
over the noncommutative ring End(Zp×Zp2) that fits with the previous protocol. In [11]
the authors solve the DHDP problem using some invertible elements in End(Zp × Zp2)
resulting a cryptanalysis of that proposal.
From the key exchange based on the DP, and analogously to the ElGamal cryptosys-
tem, we can derive a public key cryptosystem whose cryptanalysis is computationally
equivalent to the DHDP. We will give it in a general setting for semigroups, but let
us introduce first the following notation. Let t ∈ Z+ and consider a one-to-one map
β : G −→ Zt2; so, for x ∈ G, β(x) is the binary representation of t digits of x. Moreover,
we denote by ⊕ the bitwise xor operation in Zt2.
Protocol 2 (ElGamal DP protocol (EGDP protocol)): Let G be a semigroup and
assume that A,B ⊆ G are two subsemigroups such that ab = ba for every a ∈ A and
b ∈ B. Let m be the message that Bob desires to send Alice.
1. Alice chooses x ∈ G such that xa 6= ax, for every a ∈ A, and chooses a1, a2 ∈ A.
2. Alice makes public the pair (x, a1xa2).
3. Bob chooses b1, b2 ∈ B randomly and such that xbi 6= bix for i = 1, 2 and sends Alice
the pair (f, d) = (b1xb2, β
−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)).
4. Alice recovers m by computing m = β−1(β(d)⊕ β(a1fa2)).
Part 4 of the above protocol is correct because
β(d)⊕ β(a1fa2) = β(d)⊕ β(a1b1xb2a2)
= β(β−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)))⊕ β(a1b1xb2a2)
= β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)⊕ β(a1b1xb2a2)
= β(m)
since β(b1a1xa2b2) = β(a1b1xb2a2) as biai = aibi for i = 1, 2. Consequently,
β−1(β(d)⊕ β(a1fa2)) = β
−1(β(m)) = m.
We point out that if we are considering a ring R instead of a semigroup G, then we
can substitute the map β : G −→ Zt2 by the identity map in R and the xor operation
⊕ by the addition in R. Here we need the existence of a zero element in order to get
m = d− a1fa2.
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Example 1: 1. If the semigroup G is commutative, then we have that EGDP corre-
sponds to the ElGamal public key cryptosystem defined by the action of G over
itself (cf. [18]). In this case, as we pointed out in Section 1, the security of the
cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of what the authors in [18] called the SAP.
2. Let us consider the ring E
(m)
p . Then Alice and Bob can agree in a public element
M ∈ E
(m)
p . Now let S ∈ E
(m)
p be the secret that Bob wants to send Alice. Then S
may be sent in a confidential manner in the following way:
(a) Alice chooses N ∈ E
(m)
p such that NM 6= MN and two elements A1, A2 ∈
H(M) (see equation (6)), and publishes her public key (N,A1NA2).
(b) Bob chooses randomly two other elements B1, B2 ∈ Cen(M) (or simply B1, B2 ∈
H(M) as Alice) and sends her the pair given by (F,D) = (B1NB2, S +
B1A1NA2B2).
(c) Alice recovers S by computing D − A1FA2 due to the fact that Ai and Bi
commute for i = 1, 2. 
The following result shows the relation between the cryptanalysis of the EGDP and
DHDP protocols.
Theorem 4: Breaking the EGDP protocol is equivalent to solve the DHDP.
Proof: Assume that Eve can solve the DHDP and she wants to get m from
(b1xb2, β
−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2))).
Since Eve is able to solve the DHDP, then she gets b1a1xa2b2 from b1xb2 and the Alice’s
public key a1xa2. Thus she can recover
m = β−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)).
Now assume that Eve can solve the EGDP. Then she can obtain any message m from
the information x, a1xa2, b1xb2, β
−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)). If Eve wishes to get b1a1xa2b2
from x, a1xa2, b1xb2, then she encrypts m using b1xb2 as random element in step 3 of
Protocol 2, to get d = β−1(β(m) ⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)) and thus, she gets the solution to the
DHDP. 
Let us show how an analogous reasoning to the one used in the cryptanalysis introduced
in [11] may apply to break the EGDP protocol. Let us assume that Bob sends Alice the
pair
(f, d) = (b1xb2, β
−1(β(m)⊕ β(b1a1xa2b2)))
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as in the EGDP algorithm and that Eve is able to find w1, w2 commuting with every
element in A and such that fw2 = w1x. Suppose also that w2 is invertible in the semigroup
G. Then
w1a1xa2w
−1
2 = a1w1xw
−1
2 a2 = a1fa2
and thus β−1(β(d)⊕ β(w1a1xa2w
−1
2 )) = m.
Therefore, the further the subgroup of units in G is from being G, the more difficult
will be to apply this reasoning to break the EGDP protocol. This applies to the case of
E
(m)
p since as we mentioned previously, a suitable choice of p and m provides a ring such
that almost all its elements are not units.
We will finish this paper by giving some conditions on the public key used for the
EGDP protocol in the case of the ring E
(m)
p in order to avoid an attack by reducing it to
find a solution to a certain SAP.
Let us assume that Alice’s public key is given by the pair (X,A1XA2) and let Eve be
an attacker. If Eve is able to find M ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ) such that it is a solution of the SAP
MX = A1XA2, then Eve may choose H ∈ Z(E
(m)
p ) and invertible, say
H = diag
(
h0, h0 + h1p, . . . ,
m−2∑
l=0
hlp
l,
m−1∑
l=0
hlp
l
)
,
with h0 6≡p 0 (cf. [8]). Thus Eve writes MH
−1H and gets that
A1XA2 =MX = MH
−1XH,
solving the DP and therefore she solves the DHDP.
As previously noted, the next result gives conditions on the public key of the EGDP
protocol that avoid breaking it by reducing the DP to a SAP as above explained. Its
proof is a direct application of Corollary 1.
Corollary 2: In the precedent situation, let (X,P ), with P = A1XA2, be the public key
of some user of the EGDP protocol over the ring E
(m)
p . If there exists k = 1, 2, . . . , m such
that Xi,k 6≡p 0 for every i = 1, 2, . . . , m and there exists j such that X
−1
j,kPj,k 6≡p X
−1
1,kP1,k,
then an attacker cannot break the EGDP by reducing it to solve a SAP over the ring E
(m)
p .
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